

Graham Clay

curriculum vitae
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Employment

Fort Lewis College

Adjunct Instructor

Fall 2021

University of Notre Dame

Adjunct Assistant Teaching Professor

2020-2021

5+1 Postdoctoral Teaching Scholar

2019-2020

Education

University of Notre Dame

Ph.D., Philosophy

2019

Thesis: *Hume on Knowledge*

Advisor: Samuel Newlands

Committee: Don Garrett (NYU), Blake Roeber,
Katharina Kraus

M.A., Philosophy

2016

University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill

B.A., *with distinction*, Philosophy (honors), Economics

2013

Honors Thesis: *Skeptical Realist Interpretations of Hume*

Advisor: Geoffrey Sayre-McCord

Committee: Simon Blackburn, Ram Neta

Specializations

Early Modern, Epistemology, Philosophy of Mind

Competencies

Metaphysics, Ethics, Philosophy of Religion, Political Philosophy, Ancient

Publications

5. Hume's Incredible Demonstrations

Hume Studies, conditionally accepted.

4. Knowledge and Sensory Knowledge in Hume's *Treatise*

Oxford Studies in Early Modern Philosophy, volume X, 2021.

3. Can the Berkeleyan Idealist Resist Spinozist Panpsychism?

History of Philosophy & Logical Analysis, forthcoming. (with Michael Rauschenbach)

2. Aristotle's Argument from Truth in *Metaphysics Γ4*

Analysis, 79 (1): 17-24. 2019.

1. Russell and the Temporal Contiguity of Causes and Effects

Erkenntnis, 83 (6): 1245-1264. 2018.

Presentations

Hume's Incredible Demonstrations, July 2021

47th Annual Hume Society Conference in Bogota, Colombia

Towards Establishing Locke's General Ontology of Substance Dualism, June 2021

2021 John Locke Conference in Naples, Italy

What Makes Hume an External World Skeptic?, March 2021

Pacific APA online

Hume Should Deny the Law of Excluded Middle, February 2021

Central APA online

Berkeley Between Hume and Spinoza, December 2020

NYC Workshop in Early Modern Philosophy online

Hume Should Deny the Law of Excluded Middle, November 2020

Princeton-Bucharest Virtual Seminar in Early Modern Philosophy online

What Makes Hume an External World Skeptic?, June 2020
Western E-vent in Early Modern Philosophy online

Opening Remarks at *Do We Have a Right to Build the Border Wall?*, December 2019
Debate on Immigration and Citizenship in Notre Dame, USA

Hume's Denial of the Entailment Thesis, April 2019
Notre Dame Philosophy Lunchtime Talk in Notre Dame, USA

Hume and Perceptual Knowledge, December 2018
Notre Dame Philosophy Lunchtime Talk in Notre Dame, USA

Why Wasn't Berkeley a Panpsychist?, October 2018
UW-Milwaukee Berkeley Workshop in Milwaukee, USA

On Katharina Kraus's *Personal Identity and the First-Person*, November 2017
Current Issues in Self-Consciousness Workshop in Notre Dame, USA

Awards

ACLS Emerging Voices Fellowship Nomination, 2020
Nominated as one of top 4 students from Notre Dame

Hayek Fund for Scholars Grant (IHS), 2019
Awarded for Notre Dame Debate on Immigration and Citizenship

Teaching Beyond the Classroom Grant, 2019
Awarded for Notre Dame Debate on Immigration and Citizenship

Dolores Zohrab Liebmann Fellowship Nomination, 2016
Nominated as one of top 3 students in Notre Dame Philosophy Department

Teaching

As Instructor of Record and Course Designer at Notre Dame:

Persuasion and the Truth, S '21

Systematic Thinking: God, Identity, and the Moderns, S '18, S '20, F '20, S '21

Citizenship: Voting, Representation, and Parties, F '19

As Teaching Assistant at Notre Dame:

History of Modern Philosophy, F '17 (instructor: Samuel Newlands)

Introduction to Philosophy, S '16 (instructor: Joseph Karbowski)

Introduction to Philosophy, F '15 (instructor: Meghan Sullivan)

Service

Journal Referee, *History of Philosophy Quarterly*, *Philosophia*

Graduate Student Mentor Program, Notre Dame Philosophy Department, 2017-present

Early Modern Reading Group Founder, Notre Dame Philosophy Department, 2015-2020

Consultant, PhilSurvey.org project, 2018-2019

Editorial Assistant, Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews (NDPR), 2016-2017

Conference Referee, ND-NW Epistemology Conference, 2015-2017

References

Samuel Newlands
William J. & Dorothy K. O'Neill Collegiate Professor of Philosophy at Notre Dame

Don Garrett
Silver Professor of Philosophy at New York University

Meghan Sullivan
Wilsey Family Collegiate Professor of Philosophy at Notre Dame

Blake Roeber
Thomas J. and Robert T. Rolfs Associate Professor at Notre Dame

Geoffrey Sayre-McCord
Morehead-Cain Alumni Distinguished Professor of Philosophy at UNC-Chapel Hill

Dissertation Summary - *Hume on Knowledge*

Hume's account of knowledge plays a crucial role in his system, but it has been widely neglected. In my doctoral dissertation, I develop a comprehensive interpretation of Hume's account of knowledge, and I apply my interpretation to a variety of issues, interpretative and otherwise.

With the help of some of the principles that Hume is universally agreed to endorse, I argue in my first chapter that Hume's passages concerning knowledge support my interpretation of his account of knowledge at the expense of the alternatives. Under my interpretation, Hume holds that every instance of knowledge must be immediately present to the mind, have an internal relation as its object, and the relation of this relation must hold between some of its parts. Although these three conditions are extremely demanding—indeed, Hume arrives at them because he holds that knowledge requires absolute certainty—they also make room for Humean perceptual knowledge. This possibility is further supported by passages where Hume states that relations of the right kind hold between the parts of sensed things that are immediately present to the mind. If, for instance, one simultaneously sees a patch of crimson and a patch of scarlet, Hume's view is that one thereby knows that the former is darker red than the latter. So, while in many cases Humean knowledge is hard to come by, it is pervasive in the products of the senses and thus acts as a solid foundation for our subsequent thoughts. In this way, my interpretation of Hume's account of knowledge reveals a new and important aspect of Hume's empiricism.

My second chapter addresses the question of whether Hume allows for the possibility of knowledge without belief. Contemporary epistemologists have been very interested in the relationship between knowledge and belief for decades, and the consensus is that we cannot know something without believing it. I argue that Hume challenges this dogma, both in cases involving sense perception and in cases involving abstract philosophical reasoning. Hume's argumentation surrounding these cases relies heavily on the specifics of his philosophy of mind. Since many contemporary epistemologists seek to remain as neutral as possible with respect to philosophy of mind, I conclude by arguing that contemporary epistemologists have much to gain from studying and emulating Hume's methodology.

Given that Hume holds that a knower must be absolutely certain about what she knows, the specter of external world skepticism looms over him. Nevertheless, I argue in my third chapter that Hume's account of knowledge does not rule out knowledge of the external world. I argue that direct realism—views that maintain that mind-independent things are immediately present to the mind—combine with Hume's account of knowledge to entail the negation of external world skepticism. I conclude by arguing that some strains of direct realism provide even more space for Hume to deny external world skepticism, regardless of how strongly the latter view is formulated.

In my fourth chapter, I argue that Hume maintains that there are sound philosophical arguments with necessary premises that have conclusions that cannot be believed. Hume's position is independently interesting because there is good reason to think that he holds that all of the "refin'd and metaphysical" arguments distinctive of philosophy are of this sort. If Hume is right in even a single case, then we must reevaluate the role and ambitions of philosophical argumentation. My interpretation also has ramifications for our understanding of Hume's use of skeptical arguments. It is commonly held that Hume's primary use of skeptical arguments is as evidence for his account of the mind. Hume maintains that the skeptical arguments he presents all fail to generate beliefs in their conclusions, and he argues that his account of the mind is uniquely able to explain why, or so the common view goes. I argue that this understanding of Hume's relationship to skepticism relies on the assumption that he intends the skeptical arguments to be sound and to have necessary premises. If the arguments were to not have these features, they would not provide evidence for his account of the mind. Fortunately for Hume, the arguments do have these features, or so I argue.